Empirical studies have overwhelmingly shown that a lower child mortality rate leads to lower fertility. Yet it has not been possible to satisfactorily analyze this relationship in even the simplest theoretical models. This paper attempts to bridge this gap between theory and the empirical literature. The paper also presents results on the effects of child mortality changes on parental welfare. The analysis captures the dynamic stochastic feature of fertility choice, subsumes other endogenous choices (e.g., the quality of the children), and treats the number of children as a discrete variable (this added realism is important for the analysis).
I. Introduction
An ongoing concern in the economic study of population has been to understand the effects of changes in child mortality rates on parental fertility decisions. This concern stems partly from the set of unprecedented transitions in child mortality rates and parental fertility choices that have been, and continue to be, observed at different times in different countries. Empirical studies have overwhelmingly shown that the number of children produced by a couple declines as the mortality rate declines.' This relationship also appears quite alive. This, in turn, influences current and future fertility decisions. Thus fertility choice can be naturally formulated as a dynamic stochastic program.4
This paper presents some results on the effects of mortality changes on fertility. Using a single-stage choice model, I first show that some simple and plausible conditions are sufficient to yield the typically observed pattern that the number of births declines if the mortality rate declines. Then, using a two-stage dynamic stochastic model of fertility choice, I examine the effects of a decline in mortality rates on the number of births in each of the two periods, as well as on the expected number of total births. I also show how this analysis extends to a multistage dynamic stochastic model.
Another concern of this paper is to examine the effects of mortality changes on parental welfare. The assessment of such welfare effects does not appear to have received attention in the literature, even though it is a necessary component of an economic evaluation of government programs aimed at reducing child mortality. I show, for instance, that a lower mortality rate raises parental welfare. This intuitive result is, to my knowledge, new. Also, the welfare results presented here are robust. For example, they do not depend on the properties of the utility function: they are a consequence primarily of the optimizing behavior. At the same time, the results are not obvious; for example, they cannot be obtained from the envelope theorem or stochastic dominance arguments alone.
In this paper, the number of children, born or surviving, is represented as a nonnegative integer. This is obviously the correct representation of reality. Also, a continuous representation of intrinsically discrete variables may be a greater source of error in the context of fertility choice (because, in some cases, none or only one of the children born may survive) than in many other contexts (such as a factory producing millions of widgets) in which the variables have large values. In contrast, most previous theoretical studies have employed a continuous representation, perhaps because of its seeming tractability. It turns out, however, that a discrete representation yields a crisper analysis. Moreover, for reasons discussed later, this paper's results cannot easily be obtained, using assumptions comparable to those that I have used, if a continuous representation is employed. For the problem at hand, therefore, realism and tractability coincide. Also, this paper's methodology for analyzing discrete choices may be useful in examining other fertility-related questions (e.g., the fertility impact of parental preferences for children's gender) as well as other economic problems that entail discrete choices.
To focus on the fertility choice, other parental choices (e.g., child care and quality, parental human capital formation, and labor market participation) are kept in the background by assuming that these choices are made optimally for every fertility choice. Consequently, the results presented in this paper hold if these other choices and the associated budget constraints are analyzed simultaneously along with the fertility choice.
A single-stage model of fertility choice is analyzed in Section II. Section III analyzes a two-stage model and discusses its extension to a multistage model. Section IV presents some concluding remarks. The specific aim of this paper is to use simple but realistic models to extract some predictability concerning the effects of mortality changes on fertility choice and parental welfare. If no predictability can be established in simpler models, it is unlikely to be established in more general models. On the other hand, if some predictability can be established in simpler models, which turns out to be the case here, then the same approach may be useful in other models.
II. A Single-Stage Model of Fertility Choice
The number of children produced by a couple is denoted by the integer variable n. The random variable N denotes the number of children who will survive, with n -N -0. I assume that the survival of each child is an independent event with probability s, with 1 > s > 0. The mortality rate thus is 1 -s. Consequently, a larger value of s represents a regime of lower mortality.5 Also, the probability that N out of n children will survive is the binomial density b(N, n, s) sN1 l-S)nN.
(1) 5 Several modifications of this aspect are possible. One is to treat the survival of the ith child as an independent event with probability s. In this case, a regime of lower mortality may be represented by positing that s, changes to s, + 0, where 0, 2 0 for all i and 0, > 0 for at least one i. However, such a distinction among children may not be appropriate within the single-stage model under consideration here, where the underlying simplification is that all births take place at the same time and that all deaths take place at the same time in the future. If one wishes to highlight ex ante distinctions among children, then it is perhaps better to use a dynamic framework, as is done in the next section. Another possible modification is to let s depend on the number of births. In this case, a regime of lower mortality may be represented by positing that s(n) changes to s(n) + 0(n), where 0(n) : 0 for all n and 0(n) > 0 for at least one n. Given the objective of the paper, described at the end of the last section, I shall not deal with such modifications.
It is assumed that the mortality rate is an exogenous parameter to the parents, who are being considered in isolation from the rest of the economy. However, the analysis remains unaffected if, instead, the mortality rate is endogenously determined by the parents through a production function. In this case, one would examine the fertility effects of a change in parameters (e.g., preventive health technology or the prices of relevant inputs) that could potentially alter the mortality rate. Also, though the present analysis uses the number of births as the choice variable, it can be restated using the conception probability as the choice variable.
I next describe the expected utility from different numbers of births. It is convenient to begin by considering the ex post benefits and costs and by temporarily abstracting from those ex ante benefits and costs (such as childbearing costs) that depend on the number of births, but not on how many of them survive. These ex ante benefits and costs are incorporated in the last part of this section. Let u(N) denote the ex post net utility, inclusive of all benefits and costs, from N surviving children. One would expect u(N) to first increase and then decrease with N. To see this, one may write u(N) as u(N) -w(g(N) -h(N)), where g(N) denotes the benefit from N surviving children expressed in terms of a numeraire (say dollars), h(N) denotes the corresponding cost, and the function w translates the net benefit into net utility. The standard assumption concerning the benefit g(N) is that it is increasing and concave, if not strictly concave, in N. The cost h(N) includes expenditures on children as well as the imputed value of household inputs (such as parents' time) that are available in limited supply and that cannot be adequately substituted by inputs bought from the market. The importance of such aspects of postbirth costs has been pointed out in the literature (see Schultz [1976, pp. 102-4; 1988, pp. 424-37] and references therein). It is thus appropriate to assume that h(N) is increasing and strictly convex in N. Next, under the assumption that the parents are risk averse or risk neutral (i.e., w is concave in its argument), it follows that u(N) is strictly concave in N. We assume this property of u(N), although, as we shall see, it can be weakened.
The expected utility from n births, for a given s, is denoted by U(n, s). Thus U(n, s) 3 b(N, n, s)u(N). 
as For an intuitive interpretation of expression (4), compare the expected utility under two alternatives: n + 1 births versus n births. Consider n + 1 states of the world in which N = 0, 1, . . . , n children out of n births survive. Now if the (n + l)st child does not survive, then the parents have the same utility in each of the states under the two alternatives. If the (n + l)st child survives, then the parents have one more child in each of the states under the first alternative than in the second. The resulting difference in the utility, summed over all states, is EN b(N, n, s)uN(N). Thus since s is the probability that the (n + l)st child will survive, the marginal expected utility of the (n + l)st birth is given by (4). In other words, the expected utility U is strictly concave in the number of births, n. In turn, this yields the following proposition. PROPOSITION 1. Either the optimal number of births is unique or there are two neighboring numbers that are both optimal.
To prove this result, recall that n(s) denotes the largest optimal value of n. Thus it must satisfy 
This result can be established as follows. Since expression (6) holds for any fixed n, we may evaluate it at n = n(s). From (8) and (9b), the evaluation of (6) yields a Un (n = n (s), s) < 0,
as where n = n(s) indicates that the value of n is kept unchanged at n(s) in the computation of this derivative. Now let s' denote a survival probability slightly larger than s. Then (12) implies that Un(n(s), s') < Un(n(s), s). In turn, from (9b), Un(n = n(s), s') < 0.
From (8), Un is decreasing in n. Thus it follows from (13) that Un(n, s') < 0 for n ' n(s).
From (14), U(n(s), s') > U(n(s) + 1, s') > .... Consequently, a value of n larger than n(s) is not optimal at s'. I have thus shown that n(s) is locally nonincreasing in s. The global counterpart of this result is (11), and it is obtained from the local result by using standard continuity arguments (for a proof, see a more detailed version of this paper [Sah 1990 ]). Next, I rule out the uninteresting case in which the number of births remains entirely unchanged throughout the range of mortality rates. Thus (11) yields the following proposition. PROPOSITION 2. The number of births is an increasing integer function of the mortality rate.
The sole assumption concerning the ex post utility u(N) employed in the analysis above is that it is strictly concave in N. Now suppose that the ex post utility does not have this property. Even then, proposition 2 holds for local changes in the mortality rate. To see this, begin with n(s), which is the largest optimal choice at s. Now consider all those slightly larger survival probabilities s' for which the optimal choice changes at most by one. That is, the candidates for the optimal choice at s' are n(s) - To prove this result, note from (7) and (9a) that dU(n = n(s), s)/as -0. Thus U(n(s),s') ' U(n(s),s)
for a value of s' slightly larger than s. Also, definition (3) of the optimum implies
U(n(s'), s') ? U(n(s), s'). (18)
Expressions (3), (17), and (18) yield V(s') -V(s). That is, the parental welfare level, V, is locally nondecreasing in s. This result has an intuitive interpretation. Expression (17) shows that parents would be no worse off at a lower mortality rate if they were to make the same choice that was optimal at a higher mortality rate. Thus their actual welfare, corresponding to the optimal choice at a lower mortality rate, cannot be lower. A stronger result is obtained if the choices are nontrivially different at two mortality rates. Here, by a nontrivial difference I mean that a choice that is optimal at s is not optimal at s'. In this case, inequality (18) is strict. Thus it follows that parental welfare is locally increasing in s. Proposition 3 states the global counterparts of the local results just proved. Once again, the global results are obtained by using continuity arguments.
The welfare results presented above are robust because they are a consequence of the optimizing behavior, and they do not depend on the properties of the utility function. At the same time, the results are not obvious because, for instance, they require the relationship in (7).
An extension of this welfare analysis yields the magnitude of the parental gain from a decrease in the mortality rate. For example, let M denote the current parental income, and let AM denote a hypothetical increase in this income that has the same value to the parents as an increase in the survival probability from s to s'. We know from proposition 3 that AM is not negative and that it will typically be positive. Further, given any particular specification of the parental preferences and characteristics, the value of AM can be calculated from the equality V(s, M + AM) = V(s', M). This same approach is useful in models in which the parents determine the mortality rate endogenously and in which we wish to assess the magnitude of the parental gain from a change in a parameter such as preventive health technology.
Such welfare assessments can be useful. For example, governments often undertake programs aimed at reducing child mortality. Such programs are common in most developing countries, but they have also been undertaken in some developed countries for social groups experiencing high child mortality. A necessary component in an economic evaluation of such programs is the assessment of welfare gains of the type described above.
Ex Ante Costs
To incorporate the ex ante benefits and costs of different numbers of births, let C(n) denote the net utility cost that depends on the number of births, n, but not on how many of them survive, N. Then (3) is replaced by V'(s) maxn U'(n, s), where U'(n, s) = U(n, s) -C(n)
and U is given by (2). Define U'(n, s) U'(n + 1, s) -U'(n, s) and Cn(n) C(n + 1) -C(n). Define U7 and Cn accordingly. Assume that C, ? 0 and C, ? 0; that is, the marginal ex ante utility cost of births is nonnegative and nondecreasing in the number of births. From (19),
where Unn is as given by (5). The optimality conditions, (9a) and (9b), are now U'(n(s) -1, s) -0> U'(n(s), s). However, aU/Ias and aU'Ias continue to be described by the right-hand sides of (6) and (7) 
and B(N, n, s) =Eo)i b(j, n, s) denotes the cumulative probability of N or fewer survivals out of n births. To evaluate the sign of (22) Once again, this model is highly simplified. It abstracts from those costs that depend on the number of births but not on the number of surviving children, from the interim benefits or costs of the children surviving from the first period (before the outcome of the secondperiod choice is known), and from the potential fertility effects of possible deaths of the first-period children after the second-period choice has been made. These aspects are discussed later.
Let uI and u2 denote, respectively, the marginal utilities of a surviving child from the two periods; that is, ul(NI, N2) -(N1 + 1, N2) -u(NI, N2), and u2 is defined similarly. Denote the changes in these marginal utilities due to one more surviving child by u11(NI, N2)-uI(N, + 1, N2) -ul(NI, N2) and by u12 and u22, defined similarly. I assume that the surviving children from the two periods are substitutes (i.e., u2 < 0) and that u is strictly concave in N2 (i.e., U22 < 0).
Choice in the Second Period
We begin by considering the parental choice after N1 has been observed. Define U2(N1, n2, S2) > 3 b(N2, n2, s2)u(NI, N2). 
From (32), it follows that a value of n2 larger than n2(NI, S2) is not optimal for N1 + 1. In other words, n2(NI, S2) is nonincreasing in N1. Next, we rule out the case in which the optimal n2 is entirely unaffected by N1. In this uninteresting case, fertility choice is completely separable between the periods; the second period's choice could be made optimally without observing the number of surviving children from the first period. We thus obtain the following proposition.
PROPOSITION
5. The number of births in the second period is a decreasing integer function of the number of surviving children from the first period.
Choice in the First Period
The analysis of the choice in the first period differs from that described above. Let the expected utility from a given number of births in the first period be denoted by U1(nI, ss)Eb(NI, nI, SI)V2(Nls2, 
The concavity property of the expected utility U', with respect to nI, cannot be easily established at the present level of generality. Accordingly, in contrast to part i of proposition 4, the results concern-ing the uniqueness of the optimal nj cannot be easily obtained. To keep the paper brief, therefore, I shall consider only those small changes in the parameters that alter the optimal n1 by at most one and then examine whether the optimal choice decreases or increases.
The Effect of a Change in the Mortality Rate of a First-Period Child on the First-Period Choice
The effect of a change in s1 on nj (sI, S2) is described by the proposition below. The proof is omitted because it is identical to that of (15). This can be verified using (36) and (38). With these two results, the following proposition can be established (see Sah [1990] for a proof). Now assume that condition a of proposition 7 holds. Then a unit increase in NI induces no more than a unit decrease in n2(NI, S2)* Correspondingly, the right-hand side of (45) is negative because sI < 1. Putting together the two effects of sI on e, we conclude that e is nonincreasing in s1 if condition a holds.
Next, consider the effect of a change in S2 on e. From (43), S2 has two effects as well: it affects n2(NI, S2) and nI(sI, S2). The analysis of the first effect is straightforward. Part ii of proposition 4 shows that n2(NI, S2) is nonincreasing in s2. Thus (43) Analogous to the proof of proposition 3, the effect of s, on V1 can be established using (34), (37), and (38). To examine the effect of S2, suppose for a moment that the optimal choice of nj is left unchanged, although the value of S2 has increased to s'. Then it is clear from (33), (34), and part iii of proposition 4 that V' does not decrease and that V1 strictly increases if the higher value of s2 nontrivially alters the choice of n2 for even one value of N1. Compared to this outcome, the actual parental welfare will not be lower because nj will also be chosen optimally, given the changed value of S2. Thus V1(sj, s) -V'(s1, S2), and the preceding inequality is strict if the change in S2 nontrivially alters the choice of nj or any one of the choices of n2 that the parents might make in the future.
Extensions Interim Utility and Mortality
A simplification employed in the two-stage model analyzed above was that the mortality of the children born in the current period, insofar as it is a critical determinant of the current fertility decision, is revealed before the next set of decisions is made. This can be modified to incorporate age-specific mortality, as well as the interim utility (once again, net of all benefits and costs) that the parents derive in a 7These results can be strengthened in several ways. For instance, e is strictly lowered by a larger s, provided that the second-period choice, n2(NI, S2), is not entirely insensitive to N1. The reason is that inequality (44) is strict if n2(NI, S2) is decreasing in N1 for even one value of N1. Similarly, e is strictly lowered by a larger s2 provided that a larger S2 lowers n2(NI, S2) for even one value of N1. The reason is that inequality (46) is strict in this case. particular period from the surviving children from a previous period, some of whom might die in the near future. As an illustration, let the random variable N1 denote the number of first-period children surviving at the end of the period, when the second-period choice, n2, is made. Let the random variable N1 2 denote the number, out of N1, who survive until the end of the second period. Let S1,2 denote the corresponding probability of each such survival. Denote the utility beyond the second period by u (N,2, N2) and the interim (age-specific)  utility during the second period by v(N,) . Then the second-period choice continues to be represented by (25) and (26), provided that the u on the right-hand side of (25) The specification in (48) is, in general, inconsistent with parental choice under uncertainty. The reason is that the expected value of a function of a random argument can be expressed as a function solely of the expected value of the random argument (and not of its higher moments) only if the original function is linear in the random argu-8I have benefited from discussions with James Heckman on the material presented in this section. 9 Barro and Becker have analyzed dynamic population models based on dynastic utility (see Becker and Barro 1988; Barro and Becker 1989) . They focus on the expected number of surviving children, E, rather than on the number of births, n, which is the focus of the present paper and of other papers cited in this subsection. A part of their analysis deals with the effect of a change in s on E, using a utility function similar to that in (48) in which the utility depends on E. They use the effect just noted, namely, that E is increasing in s. This effect, however, may arise in other models as well. In our analysis, n is shown to be a decreasing integer function of s. Thus E may be locally increasing or decreasing in s depending on the value of s. ment. Thus the version of (48) that is consistent with choice under uncertainty, but that has not been analyzed by Ben-Porath and Welch, is U(n,s) = GIns + G2(M -pn),
where the parameter GI does not depend on n, and G2 is a function. The specification in ( whereas these probabilities depend, in general, on the number of births, n, which is a choice variable. For instance, in our notation, (1 -s)" is the probability that all n children will die. An extreme assumption that could possibly rationalize this model is that the deaths of children are completely correlated so that, regardless of the number of children, either they all live or they all die.
Remarks on the Use of a Discrete Representation
A discrete representation of the number of children, born or surviving, is obviously more realistic than a continuous representation. A discrete representation also yields crisper and better results in the present context. To see this, reconsider propositions 1, 2, and 3, using the simple single-stage model described in the beginning of Section II. Letf(N, n, s) denote the probability density of N survivals out of n births, where N and n are now treated as continuous variables. The expected utility is now U(n, s) = fnw u(N)f(N, n, s)dN instead of (2). Let a subscript denote the variable with respect to which a partial derivative is being taken. Assume that the optimal value of n, denoted by n(s), is interior. Then instead of (9a) and (9b), an optimality condition now is Un(n, s) = 0 at n = n(s). To establish the continuous versions of propositions 1, 2, and 3, one would need to show, respectively, the following: Unn(n, s) < 0 for all n,
U[ jns)-0 at = nn(s),
Un,,(n, s) U,(n, s) 0 at n n(s).
These expressions are examined in the Appendix, where it is shown that they do not follow from a set of assumptions that are either intuitive or comparable to those employed in our discrete analysis. One reason for this difference between a discrete and a continuous representation is as follows. To analyze the problem at hand, we need to evaluate the induced changes in the probabilities of various numbers of survivals (and the induced changes in expressions containing these probabilities) when n and s change. In the discrete case, these induced changes need to be evaluated only at integer values of N. In the continuous case, these changes need to be evaluated on the entire real line representing N. Moreover, the evaluation of these induced changes is greatly simplified in the discrete case when the survival probabilities are described by a functional form such as the binomial density. The reason is that the binomial density has highly tractable properties (arising partly because of the independence of discrete outcomes) that are lost to a degree even when a comparable continuous density (e.g., a normal approximation of the binomial density) is used. Finally, it is apparent from the analysis in this paper that a discrete representation can be helpful in other, more complex, models of fertility choice. Thus, in the present context, tractability and realism go hand in hand. 
